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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to sections 35-1-82,53(2), 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16, Utah 
Code Ann- 1953, as amended. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Did the Industrial Commission ("Commission") correctly 
determine and apply the lent employer doctrine to the facts in this 
matter to determine that BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") was the 
sole employer of Robert T. Phillipson ("Phillipson")? If not, what 
is the employee/employer relationship between Phillipson, Mark 
Bundy ("Bundy") and BB & B? 
B. Was the Commission required to accept the parties' 
stipulated conclusion of law that BB & B was Phillipson's statutory 
employer? 
C. Assuming that BB & B was Phillipson/s statutory employer 
and Bundy was Phillipson's general or common law employer, is the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") liable for a portion of the 
benefits awarded to Phillipson under section 35-1-107, Utah Code 
Ann., as amended in 1988? 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review to be applied in the review of all 
issues outlined above is the correction of error standard. The 
Court is to review the administrative agency's conclusions of law 
1 
without deference to determine whether the agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law.1 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The UEF hereby adopts the statement of the case contained in 
the Brief of Petitioner. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Industrial Commission of Utah adopted the findings of fact 
made by the administrative law judge with the addition of one 
additional finding: that "Phillipson was performing the work of BB 
& B on the date of his fatal industrial accident." (R. 275). 
Two contracts detail the agreement between Bundy and 
Phillipson and Bundy and BB & B. BB & B entered into an agreement 
to lease a truck and driver from Bundy. (R. 3 29-340) . Bundy and 
Phillipson entered into an agreement that Phillipson would work 
driving Bundy's truck for BB & B. (R. 354-356). 
BB & B and Bundy entered a Lease Agreement which provided that 
BB & B would lease a truck and driver from Bundy. The Lease 
Agreement provided, inter alia., that the trucks leased to BB & B 
were to be "engaged exclusively in the service of the Lessee [BB & 
B] , and that "the goods transported therein shall be transported 
pursuant to the direction of and under exclusive control and 
1
 Section 63-46b-16(4)(d), Utah Code Ann.; Morton 
International vs. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Mor-Flo Industries vs. Bd. of Review, 817 
P.2d 328 (Utah App. 1991). 
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supervision of Lessee [BB & B]". (R. 329). 
The Lease Agreement further provided that "Lessee [BB & B] 
shall the complete care, custody and control of both the leased 
equipment and the drivers furnished therewith..." (R. 330). 
The agreement then goes on to state that Bundy had exclusive 
responsibility for "hiring, setting the wages, hours and working 
conditions of and adjusting the grievances of, supervising, 
training, disciplining and firing of all drivers" and maintaining 
the equipment. (R. 330). 
Under the section of the Lease Agreement titled "Maintenance 
and Compliance Requirements," paragraph F provides: 
(F) as part of its responsibilities hereunder, Lessor 
[Bundy] shall furnish to Lessee [BB & B] a list of 
Lessor's qualified drivers and any supporting 
documentation relating thereto that Lessee may, from time 
to time, reasonably request. Lessee is hereby granted 
the right to request Lessor not to use any particular 
driver and, upon such request from Lessee, Lessor shall 
comply therewith. 
(R. 331). This paragraph effectively removes any real 
responsibility Bundy may have under the agreement to hire and fire. 
Paragraph 6 of the Lease Agreement provides that "Lessor shall 
furnish to Lessee, as soon as is practical following the completion 
of [each individual trip], the following documents and information: 
(A) Lessee's over-the-road trip report. 
(B) signed delivery receipts and receipted bills of 
lading' 
(C) current driver's chauffer's [sic] license and medical 
certificate; 
(D) driver's logs . . . 
(E) mileage report . . . 
(F) original fuel tickets and state fuel reports (which 
are to be executed in the name of Lessee [BB & B ] ; 
(G) copies of local, state or federal inspection and 
violation notices, 
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(H) detention time records . . • 
(I) such pretrip or other vehicle inspection report as 
may be required by the ICC or DOT 
With respect to said inspection reports, Lessee [BB & B] 
reserves the right to prescribe the form on which such 
inspections are to be reported. . . . 
(R. 3 32) . In paragraph 10 of the Lease Agreement BB & B agreed to 
provide Workers' Compensation Insurance, (R. 3 33) . The Lease 
Agreement further provides that BB & B shall have "the exclusive 
care custody and control of the Leased Equipment" and that "all 
load must be approved, booked and billed through the Salt Lake 
office, NO EXCEPTIONS." (R. 335). BB & B required all drivers to 
call and check in before 10:00 a.m. Mountain Standard Time each 
Monday through Friday while a Lessor is on dispatch. Violators to 
be assessed a $50.00 fine. (R. 335). Other provisions of the 
Lease Agreement deal with the procedure for obtaining an advance 
on a load and the requirement for a dispatch number on the 
paperwork. Again, violators will be assessed $30.00 for each bill 
of lading not so marked. (R. 3 3 6) 
The Independent Contractor Agreement between Bundy and 
Phillipson provided that Phillipson was hired to receive dispatches 
from BB & B transportation. (R. 3 54). This agreement further 
provided that the parties intended to create an "employer-
independent contractor relationship. Owner is interested only in 
the results to be achieved, and the methods, means, manner, and 
conduct of the work will be under the sole control of the 
contractor. (R. 355). 
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VI. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence in the record shows that BB & B maintained the 
right to supervise and control both Bundy and Phillipson and 
actually did so. Although Bundy was granted the right to supervise 
and control all drivers pursuant to his agreement with BB & B, his 
agreement with Phillipson relinquished those rights and purported 
to create an employer-independent contractor relationship. Bundy/s 
right to control was further eroded by additional language in the 
Lease Agreement between BB & B and Bundy which set out the extent 
of control that BB & B had the right to exercise with regard to the 
drivers of Bundy's trucks. The agreement also provided that BB & 
B would provide workers' compensation insurance for the drivers. 
Even if the Court determines that the Industrial Commission 
misconstrued the lent employer doctrine giving rise to employer 
liability on the part of Bundy and BB & B, the Uninsured Employers1, 
Fund is not liable to pay benefits in this matter. 
If BB & B is a statutory employer as it asserts, it will have 
no effect on the outcome of this case as decided by the Commission. 
An employee may have more than one employer under Utah law. If 
there is one employer who is insured or insolvent, UEF liability 
does not arise. Section 3 5-1-107 provides that UEF liability 
arises when the employer is liable to pay benefits, but is 
insolvent or unable to pay them. In this case, BB & B was one of 
Phillipson's employers and BB & B was insured. Section 35-1-107 
does not require the UEF to pay benefits in this matter. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
This brief will address the issues in a different order than 
the petitioner's brief. The Commission's decision in this matter 
did not deal with the interpretation of section 35-1-107. 
Therefore, we will first discuss the several approaches to 
determining the employer/employee relationship between Phillipson, 
Bundy and BB & B and then address the proper construction of 
section 35-1-107. 
A. THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT 
BUNDY LOANED PHILLIPSON TO BB & B AND THAT 
PHILLIPSON WAS UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE DIRECTION 
AND CONTROL OF BB & B. 
1. PHILLIPSON WAS A LOANED EMPLOYEE WORKING 
UNDER THE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF BB & B. 
The evidence in the record shows that Bundy hired Phillipson 
for the sole purpose of driving a truck for BB & B. Bundy and 
Phillipson entered into a contract styled an "Independent 
Contractor Agreement." The agreement clearly provides that 
Phillipson will receive dispatches from BB & B and that Phillipson 
was responsible for determining the "methods, means, manner and 
conduct of the work." (R. 355). 
The Independent Contractor Agreement further provides that the 
parties intended the agreement to set up an employer-independent 
contractor arrangement, and provides that the Owner will supply the 
truck and trucking equipment, licensing, insurance on the truck and 
all regular and extended maintenance on the truck. (R. 355-356). 
The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provides that 
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Bundy will lease trucks and drivers to BB & B for the exclusive use 
of BB & B. (R. 329-33 0) . The Lease Agreement vests the "complete 
care, custody and control of both the leased equipment and drivers 
furnished therewith" to BB & B. This provision of the Lease 
Agreement is consistent with the rules of the Utah Public Utility 
Commission which provide that a carrier using leased equipment with 
a driver furnished by the lessor must "provide for exclusive 
possession, control, and use of equipment, and the complete 
assumption of responsibility by the lessee."2 
The Lease Agreement does provide that Bundy is responsible to 
hire, set wages, hours and working conditions, adjust grievances, 
supervise, train, discipline, and fire all drivers, in addition to 
paying all operating and related expenses for the leased equipment. 
(R. 33 0). However, BB & B maintained strict control over which 
drivers could be used and the manner and type of reports to be 
filed. (R. 329-333, 335-336, 338). 
In Paragraph ten of the Lease Agreement, Bundy and BB & B 
apportioned responsibility for providing insurance coverage. The 
Lease Agreement provides that BB & B will procure and maintain 
policies of insurance to cover personal injury, workers' 
compensation insurance, property damage and damage to cargo. Bundy 
agreed to provide public liability and property damage insurance 
and all risk cargo insurance. (R. 333). 
Thus, the arrangement between Bundy and BB & B was for Bundy 
2
 R746-350-2.M.l.a.ii, U.A.C. (1994). 
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to provide trucks and drivers to work under the supervision and 
control of BB & B. Although Bundy was delegated the tasks of 
hiring, firing, setting wages, etc,, BB & B actually controlled the 
details of the work performed by Bundy and Phillipson by telling 
them where and when to go, requiring them to report in each day at 
a particular time, and by reserving the right to terminate any 
driver, (R. 329-332, 335-336), 
In Kinne vs. Industrial Commission3, the Utah Supreme Court 
apparently adopted Larson's three pronged test4 for determining 
whether a borrower of an employee is a special servant. 
When a general employer lends an employee to a 
special employer, the special employer becomes liable for 
workmen's compensation only if: 
(a) The employee has made a contract of hire, 
express or implied, with the special employer; 
(b) The work being done is essentially the work of 
the special employer; 
(c) The special employer has the right to control 
the details of the work. 
When all three of the above conditions are satisfied 
in relation to both employers, both employers are liable 
for workmen's compensation. 
Employment may also be "dual," in the sense that, 
while the employee is under contract of hire with two 
different employers, his activities on behalf of each 
employer are separate and can be identified with one 
employer or the other. When this separate identification 
can clearly be made, the particular employer whose work 
was being done at the time of injury will be held 
exclusively liable. 
1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation, (1993) § 48.00, p. 8-434. 
The evidence in this case supports the conclusion that there 
3
 609 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1980) 
4
 Blessing vs. T. Shriver & Co. , 228 A.2d 711, 713 (N.J. Super. 
1967) . 
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was an express or implied contract of hire between Phillipson and 
BB & B. Phillipson's contract with Bundy clearly stated that 
Phillipson would receive dispatches from BB & B. Further BB & B 
had the right to fire Phillipson. 
Phillipson was hired to drive a truck for BB & B, under the 
exclusive direction and control of BB & B. Phillipson contracted 
with Bundy to perform trucking and truck driver services for BB & 
B. Therefore, the work performed by Phillipson was exclusively for 
the benefit of BB & B. 
Finally, BB & B clearly retained the right to direct and 
control the work of drivers leased from Bundy. BB & B retained 
exclusive responsibility to dispatch all loads hauled in Bundy's 
trucks and prescribed call in and reporting procedures for the 
drivers. 
BB & B agreed to provide workers compensation insurance 
coverage for the drivers and should be held to its bargain with 
Bundy. This result is consistent with the requirements for 
employers who lease employees as an employee leasing company under 
35-1-42(4)(a) and is consistent with the statutory employer 
requirement of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
2. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT BB & B 
AND BUNDY WERE ENGAGED IN A JOINT ENTERPRISE 
FOR MUTUAL PROFIT, 
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "joint venture" as: 
a legal entity in the nature of a partnership engaged in 
the joint prosecution of a particular transaction for 
mutual profit• An association of persons jointly 
undertaking some commercial enterprise. It requires a 
community of interest in the performance of the subject 
matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in 
9 
connection therewith, and duty which may be altered by 
agreement, to share both in profit and losses. 
A one time grouping of two or more persons in a business 
undertaking. Unlike a partnership, a joint venture does 
not entail a continuing relationship among the parties. 
A joint venture is treated like a partnership for Federal 
income tax purposes. 
H.C. Black, Black's Law Dictionary (1983). 
Although Bundy and BB & B shared the proceeds of the loads 
hauled, they did not share equally in determining how the business 
was run as would participants in a true joint venture. The 
evidence in the record before the Industrial Commission does not 
support the conclusion that Bundy and BB & B were engaged in a 
joint enterprise for mutual gain. 
The cases cited by the Petitioner in support of such a 
conclusion are not relevant to the case at hand. The parties in 
Cook vs. Peter Kiewit & Sons5 did not dispute that they were engaged 
in a joint venture. The parties in Aragon vs. Clover Club Foods6 
were a parent company and subsidiary. The Court determined that 
the two entities constituted an employing unit analogous to a joint 
venture creating tort immunity for the parent company, Bordon. Id. 
at 255, 256. 
Bundy entered into a contract with BB & B to supply them with 
trucks and drivers. Such an arrangement is not a joint venture 
where Bundy relinquished the right to control both trucks and 
drivers to BB & B and had no voice in how the business should be 
5
 386 P.2d 616 (Utah 1963). 
6
 857 P.2d 250 (Ct.App. 1993). 
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run. 
3. BB & B COULD HAVE BEEN THE STATUTORY 
EMPLOYER OF BUNDY AND PHILLIPSON. 
Section 35-1-42(6), Utah Code Annotated, creates employer 
liability in a general contractor who contracts with a 
subcontractor to perform work which is a part or process of the 
contractor's trade or business while retaining supervision and 
control over the subcontractor and his employees. 
The facts in this case could give rise to statutory employer 
liability for workers' compensation benefits on the part of BB & B. 
Bundy entered into a contract to supply trucks and drivers to BB & 
B. The contract specified that BB & B retained the right to 
control both trucks and drivers, and, in fact, did so. Finally, 
the work performed by Bundy's drivers was truck driving, a type of 
work that is clearly part and process of the trucking business. 
Although the Commission could have accepted the stipulation of 
the parties at face value and found BB & B to be Phillipson's 
statutory employer, the result with regard to employer liability 
would have been the same. The Commission would have looked first 
to BB & B, the statutory employer, for payment of death benefits to 
Phillipson's children. 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WOULD HAVE 
REACHED THE SAME RESULT HAD IT STRICTLY APPLIED 
THE STATUTORY EMPLOYER PROVISION OF THE 
UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT-
The Petitioner makes much of the Commission's failure to adopt 
the stipulation of the parties that BB & B was the statutory 
employer of Phillipson. The Commission held BB & B solely 
11 
responsible for the payment of benefits pursuant to the loaned 
employee doctrine. However, the Commission7s application of the 
statutory employer provision of the Workers Compensation Act would 
have led to the same result.7 
In Edwards, the Commission construed section 35-1-107 to 
impose "liability only in those cases where an injured employee's 
employer is uninsured and insolvent. In Utah, an employee may have 
more than one employer. . . .The statute must be read in light of that 
fact." Jd. at 3. Therefore, any error by the Commission in 
construing the loaned employee doctrine was harmless. 
Section 35-1-42(6) provides: 
(a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over 
whose work he retains supervision or control, and this 
work is a part or process in the trade of business of the 
employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, 
all subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by 
any of these subcontractors, are considered employees of 
the original employer. 
Thus, the statutory employer provision creates an 
employee/employer relationship between contractors and their 
subcontractors and their employees. The idea is designed to 
provide workers' compensation benefits through the general 
contractor for employees of subcontractors who may not have 
insurance and to provide an incentive for general contractor 
employers to obtain proof of insurance from their subcontractors. 
7
 In the case of Edwards vs. Weather Shield, Case No. 92-1252, 
attached at appendix 5, the Commission concluded that where there 
was a solvent employer, Weather Shield, and concluded that the 
Uninsured Employers'' Fund was not liable for the payment of 
benefits. 
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This provision provides a first line of defense to aid the 
Industrial Commission in its efforts to enforce the requirement of 
§ 35-1-4 6 that all employers obtain workers compensation insurance 
for their employees. In this case, BB & B did not require Bundy to 
provide proof of workers compensation coverage for his employees 
and took no action to get out of the contract when he failed to 
provide proof of workers compensation insurance. (R. 374, 387, 
396, 402, 403, 404, 409-413). 
A statutory employer's liability under § 35-1-42 does not 
arise unless he hires an uninsured subcontractor. The Commission 
will go up the chain of subcontractors and contractors until it 
finds an insured statutory employer to pay the benefits. It makes 
no sense in the statutory scheme to create a statutory employer to 
pay benefits when he hires an uninsured subcontractor, then create 
another entity, the UEF, to share in the payment of the benefits. 
C. SECTION 35-1-107 MUST BE CONSTRUED IN CONCERT 
WITH SECTION 35-1-42. PHILLIPSON HAD AN INSURED 
EMPLOYER SO THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND IS 
NOT LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF BENEFITS IN THIS CASE. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah ("WCFU") asserts that 
section 35-1-107, requires the UEF to pay benefits when there is 
more than one employer and one of them is uninsured and insolvent. 
It is clear from its decision in Edwards that the Industrial 
Commission believes that it should look first to the statutory 
employer for insurance and payment before liability is placed on 
the UEF. 
The statutory employer provision of the Workers7 Compensation 
13 
Act8 was passed 
to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured 
subcontractors by imposing ultimate liability on the 
presumably responsible principle contractor, who has it 
within his power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass 
upon their responsibility and insist upon appropriate 
compensation protection for their workers [and] forestall 
evasion of [workmen's compensation acts] by those who 
might be tempted to subdivide their regular operations 
among subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment 
relations with the workers,... 
Bennett vs. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427, 431 quoting 1C A. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, Sections 49.14, 49.15 (1986). 
Thus, it is clear that the purpose of the statutory employer 
provision of the Workers Compensation Act is to create an employee 
employer relationship between subcontractors and their employees 
and general contractors and to impose liability on the general 
contractor in cases where, as here, the subcontractor failed to 
provide insurance as required by law. 
The statute creating the UEF,9 supplementing the protection 
afforded under the statutory employer provision, provides: 
There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund. The fund 
has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits to any person entitled to them, if 
that person's employer is individually, jointly, or 
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is 
insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or 
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, 
sureties or other security to cover workers compensation 
liabilities (emphasis added). 
8
 Utah Code Annotated, section 35-1-42(6) (1993) 
9
 Utah Code Annotated, section 35-1-107 (1993). 
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In Utah, an employee may have more than one employer. In 
this case, Phillipson had one employer, BB & B, who was neither 
uninsured nor insolvent. Therefore, because Phillipson's employer 
is able to pay worker's compensation benefits, the provisions of 
section 35-1-107 are not triggered and the UEF is not obligated to 
pay any portion of Phillipson's benefits. 
The Petitioner makes much of the proximity of the 1988 
amendments to section 35-1-107 to this Court's decision in Jacobson 
vs. Industrial Commission, 738 P.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1987), however, 
the amendments to section 3 5-1-107 were made concurrently with 
changes to section 35-1-42, the section which defines statutory 
employers, and other changes to "clean up" the language in the 
statute. The "new" language of section 3 5-1-107 does not say that 
the UEF must pay benefits whenever there is an uninsured and 
insolvent employer. The legislature apparently took "every" out of 
3 5-1-107 because it was useless surplusage. If the meaning 
suggested by WCFU was intended by the legislature, it could have 
easily said so, in § 35-1-42 as well as § 35-1-107. 
Instead, the legislature enacted amendments restricting the 
application of the statutory employer provision to situations which 
go beyond the "customary trade relationship" between a general 
contractor and a subcontractor in the construction field, added a 
homeowner's exemption and additional language regarding 
partnerships and corporate officers. 
10
 Kinne vs. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 926, 928 (Utah 
1980). 
15 
The plain language of section 3 5-1-107 when read in context 
with the statutory employer provision it is designed to complement, 
requires a finding that the Commission should look first to a 
statutory employer to pay benefits. If the statutory employer is 
insolvent or uninsured, the UEF should provide payment. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed in 
favor of finding an employer/employee relationship between a 
workman and one or more employers. The purpose for such liberal 
construction is to advance the beneficent purposes of the Act and 
provide workers' compensation benefits to injured workers. This 
is the purpose behind the creation of the "statutory employer." 
The statutory employer is liable for the payment of benefits when 
he hires an uninsured subcontractor. The idea is to create an 
incentive for the statutory employer to require his subcontractors 
to provide insurance for their workers. If a statutory employer 
properly polices his subcontractors, he will not need to worry 
about being held liable to pay for workers compensation benefits. 
If the statutory employer does not police his subcontractors, 
he pays the benefits. A statutory employer who has not fulfilled 
his obligation to insure that his subcontractors have insurance 
should not be allowed to look to the UEF for relief from a portion 
of his obligation. Such a result will reduce the incentive for the 
statutory employer to do his part to make sure that employees have 
workers compensation coverage. 
16 
To hold that the UEF is liable for a portion of every award in 
which there is an uninsured subcontractor and an insured general 
contractor will dramatically increase the liability of the UEF, 
leading to increased assessments on the workers compensation 
premiums of every employer in this state. This is not the result 
intended by the legislature in creating the UEF. 
DATED THIS /?/ DAY OF OCTOBER, 1994. 
\Ad£n 
Sharon J. Ebien 
Uninsured Employers7 Fund 
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35-1-39. Violation of j u d g m e n t s , o r d e r s , dec ree s 
o r provis ions of ac t — G r a d e of of-
fense. 
If any employer, employee or other person violates 
any provision of this title, or does any act prohibited 
hereby, or fails or refuses to perform any duty law-
fully imposed, or fails, neglects or refuses to obey any 
lawful order given or made by the commission, or any 
judgment or decree made by any court in connection 
with the provisions of this title, such employer, em-
ployee or other person shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. 1953 
35-1-40. E a c h day ' s default a separate offense. 
Every day during which any person or corporation 
fails to observe and comply with any order of the com-
mission, or to perform any duty imposed by this title 
shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. 1953 
35-1-41. Fu rn i sh ing information to commiss ion 
— Employe r s ' annual report"— Rights 
of commiss ion — Examination of em-
ployers u n d e r oath — Pena l t i e s . 
Every employer shall furnish the commission, upon 
request, all information required by it to carry out 
the purposes of this title. In the month of July of each 
year every employer shall prepare and mail to the 
commission a statement containing the following in-
formation, viz: The number of persons employed dur-
ing the preceding year from Jul}7 1, to June 30, inclu-
sive; the number of such persons employed at each 
kind of employment; the scale of wages paid in each 
class of employment, showing the minimum and max-
imum wages paid; and the aggregate amount of 
wages paid to all employees; which information shall 
be furnished on blanks to be prepared by the commis-
sion and furnished employers free of charge upon re-
quest therefor. Every employer shall cause such 
blanks to be properly filled out so as to answer full}7 
and correctly all questions therein propounded, and 
shall give all the information therein sought, or, if 
unable to do so, he shall give to the commission, in 
writing, good and sufficient reasons for such failure. 
The commission may require the information herein 
required to be furnished to be made under oath and 
returned to the commission within the period fixed bv^ 
it or by law. The commission, or any member thereof, / 
or any person employed by the commission for that ; 
purpose, shall have the right to examine, under oath,: 
any employer, his agents or employees, for the pur-i 
pose of ascertaining any information which such em-
ployer is required by this title to furnish to the com-; 
mission. Any employer who, within a reasonable time 
to be fixed by the commission and after the receipt of 
written notice signed by at least two members of the 
commission specifying the information demanded and 
served by registered mail, refuses to furnish to the 
commission the annual statement herein required, or 
who refuses to furnish such other information as may 
be required by the commission under authority of this 
section, or who willfully furnishes a false or untrue 
statement shall be liable to a penalty of not to exceed 
$500 for each offense to be recovered in a civil action 
brought by and in the name of the commission. All 
such penalties when collected shall be paid into the 
combined injury benefit fund. 1977 
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined — 
Regularly employed — Statutory em-
ployers. 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and 
school district in the state are considered em-
ployers under this title. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in 
this title prescribed in Sections 35-1-60 and 
35-2-3, the state is considered to be a single em-
ployer and includes any office, department 
agency, authority, commission, board, institu-
tion, hospital, college, university, or other instru-
^ —mentality of the state. 
( (2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each per-
sonTincluding each public utility and each indepen-
dent contractor, who regularly employs one or more 
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or 
about the same establishment, under any contract of 
hire, express or implied, oral or written is considered 
an employer under this title. As used in this subsec-
tion: 
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in 
the usual course of the trade, business, profes-
sion, or occupation of the employer, whether con-
tinuous throughout the year or for only a portion 
of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any per-
son engaged in the performance of any work for 
another who, while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution 
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of 
the employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordi-
nate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing 
arrangement under Title 58, Chapter 59, Em-
ployee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is con-
sidered the employer of leased employees and 
shall secure workers' compensation benefits for 
them by complying with Subsection 35-l-46(l)(a) 
or (b) and commission rules. 
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a 
risk showing the leasing company as the named 
insured and each client company as an additional 
insured by means of individual endorsements. 
(c) Endorsements must be filed with the com-
mission as directed by rule. 
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered 
an employer under this title if: 
(i) his employees are all members of his 
immediate family and he has a proprietary 
interest in the farm where they work; or 
(ii) he employed five or fewrer persons 
other than immediate family members for 40 
hours or more per week per employee for 13 
consecutive weeks during any part of the 
preceding 12 months. 
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ 
one employee or more than one employee at least 
40 hours per week is not considered an employer 
under this title. 
(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domes-
tic servants who is not under this title has the right 
and option to come under it by complying with its 
provisions and the rules of the commission. 
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures 
any work to be done wholly or in part for him by 
a contractor over whose work he retains supervi-
sion or control, and this work is a part or process 
in the trade or business of the employer, the con-
tractor, all persons employed by him, all subcon-
tractors under him, and all persons employed by 
any of these subcontractors, are considered em-
ployees of the original employer. s 
(b) A general contractor may not be considered > 
to have retained supervision or control over tne^ 
work of a subcontractor solely because of the cus~J 
tomary trade relationship between general con 
tractors and subcontractors 
(c) A portion of a construction project subcon 
tracted to others may be considered to be a part 
or process in the trade or business of the general 
building contractor, only if the general building 
contractor, without regard to whether or not it 
would need additional employees, w ould perform 
the work in the normal course of its trade or busi 
ness 
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing 
improving, repairing, or remodelling a residence 
that he owns or is in the process of acquiring as 
his personal residence may not be considered an 
employee or employer solely by operation of Sub 
section (a) 
(e) A partner in a partnership or an o\\ ner of a 
sole proprietorship mav not be considered an em 
plovee under Subsection (a) if 
(1) the person is not included as an em 
ployee under Subsection 35 1 43(3)(a) or 
(n) the person is included as an employee 
under Subsection 35 1 43(3)(a), but his em 
ployer fails to insure or otherwise provide 
adequate pa>ment of direct compensation, 
which failure is attributable to an act or 
omission over which the person had or 
shared control or responsibility 
(f) For purposes of Subsection (e)(n) 
(l) a partner of a partnership and an 
owner of a sole proprietorship are presumed 
to have had or shared control or responsibil 
lty for any failure to insure or otherwise pro 
vide adequate pavment of direct compensa 
tion, the burden of proof being on anv person 
seeking to establish the contrary, and 
(n) evidence affirmatively est?bhshing 
that a partner of a partnership or an owner 
of a sole proprietorship had or shared control 
or responsibility for any failure to injure or 
otherwise provide adequate pavment of di 
rect compensation ma> only be overcome bv 
clear and convincing evidence to the con 
trary 
(g) A director or officer of a corporation ma\ 
not be considered an employee under Subsection 
(a) if the director or officer is excluded from cov 
erage under Subsection 35 1 43(3)(b) 1993 
35 1 43 "Employee , " " w o r k e r " or " w o r k m e n " 
a n d " o p e r a t i v e " defined — Mining les 
sees a n d sub les sees — P a r t n e r s a n d 
sole p r o p r i e t o r s — Corpo ra t e officers 
a n d d i r e c t o r s — Rea l es ta te agen ts a n d 
b r o k e r s 
(1) As used in this chapter, 'employee, worker 
or workmen," and "operative" mean 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and 
any other person, in the service of the state, or of 
anv county, city, town, or school district within 
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, 
town, or school district under any election or ap 
pointment, or under any contract of hire express 
or implied, written or oral, including each officer 
and employee of the state institutions of learning 
and members of the National Guard while on 
state active duty, and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, 
as defined in Section 35 1 42, who employs one or 
more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
oral or written, including aliens and minors, 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but 
not including any person whose employment is 
casual and not in the usual course of the trade 
business or occupation of his employer 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an em 
plo3er under this chapter, any lessee in mines or of 
mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the 
lessor under this chapter, and shall be subject to this 
chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent 
as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such 
wages as are paid employees for substantially similar 
work The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insur 
ance premium for tha t type of work 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may 
elect to include as an employee under this chap 
ter any partner of the partnership or the owner of 
the sole proprietorship If a partnership or sole 
proprietorship makes this election, it shall serve 
written notice upon its insurance carrier and 
upon the commission naming the persons to be 
cov ered No partner of a partnership or owner of 
a sole proprietorship is considered an employee 
under this chapter until this notice has been 
given For premium rate making, the insurance 
carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the 
employee to be 150% of- the state's average 
weeklv wage 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any 
director or officer of the corporation as an em 
plovee under this chapter If a corporation makes 
this election, it shall serve written notice upon 
it^ insurance carrier and upon the commission 
naming the persons to be excluded from cover 
age A director or officer of a corporation is con 
side^ed an employee under this chapter until this 
notice has been given 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or workman ' and 'operative' do not include a real 
estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Sec 
tion 6 1 2 2 who performs services in tha t capacity for 
a real estate broker if 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from 
real estate commissions, 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or asso 
ciated broker are performed under a written con 
tract specifvmg that the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor, and 
(c) the contract states tha t the real estate 
agent or associated broker is not to be treated as 
an employee for federal income tax purposes 
(5) As used m this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or workman," and "operative" do not include an of 
fender performing labor under Section 64 13 16 or 
64 13 19 except as required by federal s tatute or reg 
ulation 1993 
35 1-44 Definition of t e r m s 
The following terms as used in this title shall be 
construed as follows 
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the av 
erage week!} earnings arrived a t by the rules 
provided in Section 35 1 75 
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of 
the commission as to the amount of compensation 
due any injured, or the dependents of any de-
ceased, employee 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and 
benefits provided for in this t i t le 
Appendix 2 
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(9) A copy of the physician's initial report shall be 
furnished to the commission, the emplo\ee, and the 
employer or its insurance carnei 
(10) Any physician, surgeon, or other health pro 
vider, excluding any hospital, who refuses or neglects 
to make any report or comply with this section is 
guilty of a class C misdemeanoi for each offense, un 
less the commission finds that there is good cause for 
submitting a late report 1990 
35-1-98. Claims and benefi ts 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, m 
nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's 
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee 
does not incur medical expenses reasonably related to 
the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to 
his employer or insurance carrier for pa\ment, for a 
period of three consecutive yeais 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total 
disability benefits, temporary partial disability bene 
fits, permanent partial disabihU benefits or perma 
nent total disability benefits is barred, unless an ap 
plication for hearing is filed "with the commission 
within six years after the date of the accident 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an 
application for hearing is filed within one year of the 
date of death of the employee 1990 
35-1-99, 35-1-100. Repea led . 198S, 1990 
35-1-101. A t to rney gene ra l and count} a t tor-
neys — Dut ies . 
Upon the request of the commission the attorney 
general, or any county attorney, shall institute and 
prosecute the necessary actions or proceedings foi the 
enforcement of any order of the commission or of any 
of the provisions of this chapter, or defend an}' suit, 
action or proceeding brought against the commission, 
or the members thereof in their official capacity 1979 
35-1-102. E x p e n s e s in a c q u i r i n g informat ion au-
thor ized . 
The commission may make necessary expenditure^ 
to obtain statistical and other information provided 
for herein 1953 
35-1-103. Biennial report to governor . 
On or before the 1st day of December preceding the 
regular session of the Legislature the commission 
under the oath of at least two of its membeis, shall 
make a report to the governor for the preceding bien-
nial period, which shall include a statement of the 
number of aw7ards made by it, and a general state-
ment of the causes of accidents leading to the injuries 
for which the awards were made a detailed state 
ment of the disbursements from the expense fund, 
and the condition of its respecti\e fundb together 
v-ith an>' other matters which the commission deems 
proper to call to the attention of the governor, includ-
ing any recommendations it ma}' have to make, and it 
shall be the duty of the commission from time to time 
to puhhsh -and d\stnb\ito amcmg empVoyeis ai\d em-
ployees such general information as to the business 
transacted by the commission as in its judgment may 
be useful
 1 9 5j 
M-104. Publication of o r d e r s , ru les , and rates. 
The commission shall cause to be printed, in proper 
wrrn for distribution to the public, its orders, classifi-
^\\f' n ? l e s ' " R a t i o n s and rules of procedure, and 
U furnish the same to any person upon application 
J ^ f o r . The expense of such publication shall be au-
and paid as are other expenses of the commis-
sion The director of finance shall publish the rates 
fixed by it for insuiance in the Workers' Compe 
tion Fund of Utah 
:nsa-
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35-1-105. Injunction prohibited. 
No injunction shall issue suspending or restraining 
any order, award, or classification adopted by the 
commission, or any action of the state auditor, state 
VrrasvrreT, attorney g^sraral W t W -axidYtoT w t rea-
surer of any county, required to be taken by them or 
any of them by any of the provisions of this title, but 
nothing herein shall affect any right or defense in 
any action brought by the commission or the state in 
pursuance of authority contained in this title 1953 
35-1-106. Partial invalidi ty — S a v i n g c lause . 
Should any section or provision of this title be de-
cided by the courts to be unconstitutional or invalid 
the same shall not affect the validity of the title as a 
whole or any part thereof other than the part so de 
cided to be unconstitutional 1953 
35-1-107. Uninsured E m p l o y e r s ' F u n d . 
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' 
Fund The fund has the purpose of assisting in the 
payment of workers' compensation benefits to any 
person entitled to them, if that person's employer is 
individually, jointly, or severally liable to pay the 
benefits, but becomes or is insolvent, appoints or has 
appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have suffi-
cient funds, insurance, sureties, or other security to 
cover workers' compensation liabilities This fund 
succeeds to all monies previously held in the Default 
Indemnity Fund If it becomes necessary to pay bene 
fits, the fund is liable for all obligations of the em 
pi oyer as set forth m Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with 
the exception of penalties on those obligations 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall 
be provided under Subsection 59-9-101(2) The state 
treasurer is the custodian of the Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund and the commission shall direct its dis 
tribution Reasonable costs of administration may be 
paid from the fund The commission shall employ 
counsel to represent the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against 
or on behalf of the fund Upon the request of the com-
mission, the attorney general, city attorney, or 
county attorney of the locality in which any investi-
gation, hearing, or t i ial under this title is pending, or 
in which the employee resides or an employer resides 
or is doing business, shall aid in the representation of 
the fund 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other 
benefits paid or payable to or on behalf of an em-
ployee oi the employee's dependents from the Unin-
sured Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has 
all the rights, powers, and benefits of the employee or 
the employee's dependents against the employer fail-
ing to make the compensation payments 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory 
successor of an insolvent employer is bound by settle-
ments of covered claims hy. the €vm& T h e court wi th 
jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this 
section a priority equal to that to which the claimant 
would have been entitled in the absence of this sec-
tion against the assets of the insolvent employer The 
expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be ac-
corded the same priority as the liquidator's expenses. 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the 
receiver, trustee, or liquidator of the insolvent em-
ployer or insurance carrier statements of the covered 
claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated 
claims against the fund which shall preserve the 
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rights of the fund for claims against the assets of the 
insolvent employer 
(6) When any injury or death for which compensa 
tion is payable from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, the fund 
has the same rights as allowed under Section 35 1 62 
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' 
Compensation Division of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting 
its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting 
company, risk management company, insurance com 
pany, or other company that has expertise and capa-
bilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensa 
tion claims 
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the 
commission, upon rendering a decision with respect 
to any claim for workers' compensation benefits in 
which an uninsured employer was duly joined as a 
party, shall order the uninsured employer to reim-
burse the Uninsured Employers' Fund for all benefits 
paid to or on behalf of an injured employee by the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund along with interest, 
costs, and attorneys' fees The commission shall im-
pose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 
15% of the value of the total award m connection with 
the claim, and shall direct that the additional penalty 
be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund Awards 
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter 
(9) The liability of the state, the industrial com 
mission, and the state treasurer, w ith respect to pay-
ment of any compensation benefits, expenses, feeb or 
disbursement pioperly chargeable against the fund, 
is limited to the assets in the fund, and they are not 
otherwise in any way liable for the making of any 
payment 
(10) The commission may make reasonable lules 
for the processing and payment of claims for compen-
sation from the fund 
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Un 
insured Employers' Fund to pay benefits under this 
section to any employee of an insolvent self-insured 
employer, the Uninsured Employers' Fund ma\ as-
sess all other self-insured employers amounts neces-
sary to pay 
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to 
an insolvency, 
(b) the expenses of handling co\ered claims 
subsequent to an insolvency, 
(c) the cost of examinations undei Subsection 
(12), and 
(d) other expenses authorized bv this section 
The assessments of each self-insured employer 
shall be in the proportion that the manual pre-
mium of the self-insured employer for the preced-
ing calendar year bears to the manual premium 
of all self-insured employers for the preceding 
calendar year Each self-insured employer shall 
be notified of his assessment not later than 30 
days before it is due No self-insured employer 
may be assessed in any year an amount greater 
than 2% of tha t self-insured employer's manual 
premium for the preceding calendar year If the 
maximum assessment does not provide in any 
one year an amount sufficient to make all neces-
sary payments from the fund for one or more in-
solvent self-insured employers, the unpaid por-
tion shall be paid as soon as funds become avail-
able All self-insured employers are liable under 
this section for a period not to exceed three years 
after the self-insured employer's voluntary or in-
voluntary termination of self-insurance privi-
leges within this state This subsection does not 
appl} to claims made against an insolvent self 
insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior 
to July 1, 1986 
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to 
notify the industrial commission of any information 
indicating that any self insured employer may be in 
solvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its 
employees or the public Upon receipt of tha t notifica 
tion and with good cause appearing, the industrial 
commission may order an examination of that self 
insured employer The cost of the examination shall 
be assessed against all self-insured employers as pro 
vided m Subsection (11) The results of the examina 
tion shall be kept confidential 
(13) In any claim against an employer by the Un-
insured Employers' Fund, or by or on behalf of the 
emplovee to whom oi to whose dependents compensa 
tion and other benefits are paid or payable from the 
fund, the burden of proof is on the employer or other 
party in interest objecting to the claim The claim is 
presumed to be valid up to the full amount of 
workers' compensation benefits claimed by the em-
ployee or his dependents This subsection applies 
whether the claim is filed m court or in an adjudica 
tive proceeding under the authority of the commis 
sion 
(14) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a 
sole proprietorship ma> not recover compensation or 
other benefits from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
if 
(a) the person is not included as an employee 
under Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), or 
(b) the person is included as an employee un-
der Subsection 35-l-43(3)(a), but his employer 
fails to insure or otherwise provide adequate pay 
ment of direct compensation, which failure is at-
tributable to an act or omission over which the 
person had or shaied control or responsibility 
(15) For purposes of Subsection (14)(b) 
(a) a partner of a partnership and an owner of 
a sole proprietorship are presumed to have had or 
shared control or responsibility for any failure to 
insure or otherwise provide adequate payment of 
direct compensation, the burden of proof being on 
any person seeking to establish the contrary, and 
(b) evidence affirmatively establishing that a 
partner of a partnership or an owner of a sole 
proprietorship had or shared control or responsi-
bility for any failure to insure or otherwise pro-
vide adequate payment of direct compensation 
may only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence to the contrary 
(16) A director or officer of a corporation may not 
recover compensation or other benefits from the Un-
insured Employers' Fund if the director or officer is 
excluded from coverage under Subsection 35-1-
43(3)(b) 1990 
35-1-108. M a n a g e d health care — Health ca re 
cost containment. 
(1) Self-insured employers and workers' compensa-
tion carriers may adopt a managed health care pro-
gram to provide employees the benefits of this title, 
beginning January 1, 1993 The plan may include one 
or more of the following. 
(a) (1) A preferred provider program may be 
developed so long as the program allows a 
selection by the employee of more than one 
physician in the health care specialty re-
quired for treating the specific problem of an 
industrial patient. If a preferred provider 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent * 
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA * 
PHILLIPSON, STEPHEN BURDELL * 
PHILLIPSON, and JAZMIN DANIELLE * 
PHILLIPSON, Minor Dependent * 
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSON, * 
Deceased- * 
* 
vs. * 
MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY TRUCKING * 
(uninsured), BB & B TRANSPORTATION * 
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND * 
OF UTAH, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND,* 
* 
Respondents. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews the 
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63 
-46b-12. 
The minor dependent children of Robert T. Phillipson 
("applicants") filed a claim for workers' compensation death 
benefits pursuant to the industrially caused death of their father. 
BB & B Transportation ("BB & B") stipulated that it was the 
statutory employer of Mr. Phillipson. The administrative law judge 
("ALJ") found that the Mark Bundy dba Bundy Trucking ("Bundy") was 
Mr. Phillipson7s common law or actual employer and ordered that the 
liability for the payment of benefits be shared jointly and 
severally between Bundy and BB & B. The ALJ ordered that benefits 
to be paid initially by the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
("WCFU"), BB & B's insurer, with a right to recover 50% of the 
benefits paid from Bundy. If Bundy does not have sufficient assets 
to pay his 50% portion of benefits, the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
("UEF") was ordered to make the payments for Bundy. 
Respondent Bundy filed a motion for review asserting that BB 
& B was the sole employer of Phillipson and that Phillipson was an 
independent contractor to Bundy. The UEF filed a motion for review 
of that portion of the order which ordered the UEF to pay benefits 
if Bundy is unable to pay his share of the award. 
We hereby adopt the findings of fact contained in the 
administrative law judge's order of May 6, 1993 with the following 
additional finding: 
1. Phillipson was performing the work of BB & B on the date of 
his fatal industrial accident. 
ORDER 
GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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I- WAS BB & B PHILLIPSON'S SOLE EMPLOYER? 
Bundy argues that BB & B was Phillipson's sole employer and, 
therefore, solely liable for his workers' compensation benefits. 
It appears that the Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B 
provides that Bundy lease a truck and loan a driver to BB & B. A 
loaned employee may be the employee of either the general employer 
or the special employer depending upon the circumstances of the 
case.1 According to Professor Larson, the general employer will be 
presumed liable unless it can-be shown that the special employer 
has been substituted for the general employer- To overcome the 
presumption, the evidence must show: (1) a contract of hire 
between the special employer and the employee; (2) proof that the 
work being done at the time of injury was essentially the work of 
the special employer; and (3) proof that the special employer 
assumed the right to control the details of the work. Xd. at 8-
457. 
Utah courts have determined that the right to supervision and 
control is the most important factor for determining whether an 
employee/employer relationship exists.2 Utah law further provides 
that a contract between an employee and special employer may be 
implied by conduct of the parties.3 
The decedent and Bundy entered into an agreement whereby 
decedent agreed to "receiv[e] dispatches from BB & B 
Transportation." The agreement was entered on January 22, 1991. 
The decedent's spouse testified that she took approximately ten 
trips with the decedent and that on each of those trips the 
decedent was required to report in to BB & B on a regular basis. 
The evidence indicates that the decedent regularly drove for BB & 
B and agreed to an employee/employer relationship between himself 
and BB & B. 
The Lease Agreement stated that BB & B was an "irregular route 
for hire carrier [with ICC authorization to transport] General 
Commodities between points in the Continental United States." The 
decedent regularly operated a truck transporting commodities for BB 
& B and was doing so at the time of his fatal industrial accident. 
Therefore, at the time of his accident, decedent was performing the 
work of BB & B and not Bundy. 
1
 See LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 48,00. (1992 Ed.) 
2
 Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 
1975). 
3
 Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1292 (Utah 1976) • 
00276 
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The Lease Agreement between Bundy and BB & B provided that 
Bundy "shall furnish a driver or drivers for each unit of the 
Leased Equipment11 and that the Lessee (BB & B) "shall have the 
complete care, custody and control of both the Leased Equipment and 
drivers furnished therewith..." (emphasis added). The agreement 
further provides that Bundy "shall have full and exclusive 
responsibility for: (A) hiring, setting the wages, hours and 
working conditions of and adjusting the grievances of, supervising, 
training, disciplining and firing of all drivers..." Thus, BB & B 
had the ultimate right to control the decedent's work. Bundy's 
role was either that of a supervisor for BB & B or an employer who 
retained some control over his loaned employee. Bundy's failure to 
relinquish all control over his loaned employee does not affect the 
application of the loaned servant doctrine.4 
BB & B exercised the right to control the loaned employees 
that was granted in the Lease Agreement. BB & B required the 
decedent to report to its dispatcher each day before 10:00 a.m. 
Mountain Time and to haul only loads that BB & B approved. BB & B 
also had the right to refuse to use any driver provided by Bundy. 
These factors support the conclusion that BB & B exercised the 
right to control the work of the decedent. 
The Lease Agreement further provided that BB & B would provide 
workers' compensation insurance.5 Therefore, a preponderance of 
the evidence supports the conclusion that decedent was a loaned 
employee in the service of BB & B at the time of his fatal 
industrial accident.6 Therefore, the liability for payment of 
4
 "It has never been held by this Court that for the loaned 
servant doctrine to apply, the original employer must completely 
surrender all control over his loaned employee." Bambrough v« 
Bethers at 1292. 
5
 "It is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible for 
obligations he assumes by contract." Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). 
6
 This case may be distinguished from Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission, 609 P. 2d 926 (Utah 1980) , in which both the truck owner 
and lessee were held liable for benefits. In Kinne, the employee 
was injured while performing truck maintenance, a job which 
benefitted both the truck owner and the lessee. In the present 
case, decedent was performing the work of the lessee at the time of 
his injury* The contract in Kinne provided that the lessor would 
provide workers' compensation insurance and be responsible for the 
direction and control of the drivers. In this case, the contract 
provided that the lessee would provide workers' compensation 
insurance and retain the ultimate right to direct and control the 
ftf>27? 
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workers' compensation benefits rests solely with BB & B and its 
insurance carrier, the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
We conclude that decedent was a loaned employee solely in the 
service of BB & B at the time of the fatal industrial accident. 
Therefore, Bundy and, by extension, the Uninsured Employers' Fund, 
are not liable for any portion of the benefits awarded. 
We will not address the additional issues raised by the 
parties because they are rendered moot by our decision above. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the findings of fact of the 
administrative law judge are adopted as amended above. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the order of the 
administrative law judge dated May 6, 1993 be amended to read as 
follows: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74787-2, which account has as its owner Joshua J. 
Newton. No disbursements shall be made from the account 
without the written authorization of the Commission upon 
a showing of need. The benefits awarded herein shall 
commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate of $77.25 
per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 1997. 
Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct 
$1,875.00 from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall 
remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the 
applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74788-0, which account has as its owner Shayla M. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
drivers. 
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including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Shayla, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74789-8, which account has as its owner Stephen B. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Stephen, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that BB & B Transportation 
/Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain America 
Credit Union , $24,102.00 for deposit in share account 
#74790-6, which account has as its owner Jazmin D. 
Phillipson. No disbursements shall be made from the 
account without the written authorization of the 
Commission upon a showing of need. The benefits awarded 
herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at the rate 
of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 
2, 1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum 
including interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall 
deduct $1,875.00 from the accrued award to Jazmin, and 
shall remit the same to Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for 
the applicants, for services rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit 
Union mail quarterly statements to the children c/o 
Melanie Phillipson, 148 West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT 
84648. Mrs. Phillipson shall furnish Mountain America 
Credit Union with social security numbers for the 
children to facilitate the reporting of interest income, 
and she is responsible for filing any required income tax 
returns. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, B B & B 
Transportation /Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, shall 
pay Kevin Sutterfield, Attorney for the applicant, the 
sum of $7500,00, for services rendered in this matter, 
the same to be deducted from the aforesaid awards to the 
children as previously provided. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1, 
1997, the Workers' Compensation Fund shall send 
Declaration of Dependency forms to Melanie Phillipson 
prior to the termination of the benefits awarded to the 
children herein. Thereafter, the children will be 
entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants 
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death 
benefits received by them at that time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED-'that any Motion for Review of 
the foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty 
(30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or 
appeal. 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
Any request for reconsideration by the Industrial Commission 
must be filed within 2 0 days of the date of this Order. A request 
for reconsideration is not required prior to filing an appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. An appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
must be filed within 3 0 days of the date of this Order. 
002 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid 
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of JOSHUA J. NEWTON & SHAYLA 
MARIA PHILLIPSON, Case Number 92-926 & 92-1132, on fl ^ fc^day of 
i)U<-^<^-- 19 9*f to the following: 
MELANIE PHILLIPSEN 
148 WEST 100 NORTH #A-1 
NEPHI, UTAH 84648 
KEVIN SUTTERFIELD 
P 0 BOX 778 
PROVO, UTAH 84603 
MARK BUNDY TRUCKING 
P O BOX 192 
NEPHI, UTAH 846548 
STUART WEED 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE SUITE 1800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1004 
B B Sc B TRANSPORTATION 
P O BOX 7061 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
RICHARD G. SUMSION 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
THOMAS STURDY 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND 
CINDY PETERSON 
MOUNTAIN AMERICA CREDIT UNION 
P O BOX 45001 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145 
T. C. ALLEN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Paralegal 
General Counsel7s Office 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Appendix 4 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92-926 & 92-1132 
JOSHUA J. NEWTON, Minor Dependent* 
Stepson of, and SHAYLA MARIA * 
PHILLIPSEN, STEPHEN BURDELL * 
PHILLIPSEN, and JAZMIN DANIELLE * 
PHILLIPSEN, Minor Dependent * 
Children of ROBERT T. PHILLIPSEN,* 
Deceased, * 
* 
Applicants, * 
* 
vs. * 
* 
MARK BUNDY dba MARK BUNDY * 
TRUCKING (UNINSURED) , B B & B * 
TRANSPORTATION and/or WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, * 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 22, 
1993, at 1:00 o'clock p.m.; same being pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
APPEARANCES: Applicants were represented by Kevin Sutterfield, 
Attorney at Law. 
Defendant, Mark Bundy was present and represented by 
Stuart Weed, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant, B B & B Transportation was represented by 
Irene Warr, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
was represented by Richard G. Sumsion, Attorney at 
Law. 
i-M 0 7 1993 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by 
Thomas C. Sturdy, Attorney at Law. 
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Being 
fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is 
prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
At the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, by and through counsel, notified the 
Administrative Law Judge that it and its insured, B B & B 
Transportation, were stipulating that B B & B Transportation was 
the statutory employer of the decedent, Robert T. Phillipsen, In 
light of the Stipulation, the litigation of the statutory employer 
issue was thus rendered moot. However, there remains an issue with 
respect to whether or not B B & B Transportation, in addition to 
being the statutory employer of the decedent was, in fact, his sole 
employer. Dispositive Motions had previously been filed by the 
parties, which were taken under advisement pending -the conclusion 
of the evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the issues have been well 
briefed. As will appear from the discussion which will follow, the 
Administrative Law Judge found and concluded that the decedent, Mr. 
Phillipsen, had two employers at the time of his death, his common 
law or actual employer, Mark Bundy, and his statutory employer, 
B B & B Transportation. 
The decedent herein, Robert T. Phillipsen, was driving a truck 
owned by Bundy Trucking and leased to B B & B Transportation when 
he was involved in a fatal industrial accident on May 10, 1991. At 
the time of his death, there were four minor children living in his 
home, who were dependent upon him for support, namely, Joshua J. 
Newton, (DOB: 2-22-85), Shayla Marie Phillipsen, (DOB: 7-15-86), 
Stephen Burdell Phillipsen, (DOB: 4-7-88), and Jazmin Danielle 
Phillipsen, (DOB: 1-17-92). The decedent was also married to 
Melanie Phillipsen, who was living with him at the time of his 
death. Melanie Phillipsen filed a claim for workers compensation 
benefits with the Industrial Commission on August 3, 1992. 
Thereafter, the Uninsured Employers Fund, by and through counsel, 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Mrs. Phillipsen's claim on the grounds 
that she did not file the same within one year of the decedent's 
date of death as required by §35-1-98. The Administrative Law 
Judge in a letter Order of November 16, 1992, granted the Motion to 
Dismiss on behalf of the Uninsured Employers Fund as to Melanie 
Phillipsen. However, the Administrative Law Judge also found that 
the effects of §35-1-98, are tolled by §78-12-36, with respect to 
the minor dependent children of the deceased. No appeal Jaaving 
been taken of that Order, that Order is now the final award of the 
Commission. Based on that Order, the claim was styled as is 
presently provided. 
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At the time of his death, the decedent was averaging $1,978 
per month in wages. Based on the foregoing, the dependents of the 
deceased would be entitled to a base compensation award of $3 05.00 
per week when rounded to the nearest whole dollar. When the 
dependents allowance is added to the award, the applicants are then 
entitled to the maximum award provided by law of $309.00 per week. 
Since there are four dependents of the deceased, each child shall 
be entitled to an award of $77.25 per week. The benefits to be 
awarded to the minor dependents shall be placed in trust accounts 
at the Mountain America Credit Union, and shall be disbursed only 
upon a written showing of need. Upon reaching the age of eighteen, 
the balance found remaining in each account shall become the sole 
property of that child. The total award for the initial six years 
shall be $96,408.00, which would entitle each child to an award of 
$24,102.00 for the first six years of benefits. 
As intimated earlier, the remaining issues in this case 
involve whether or not the applicant was the sole employee of 
B B & B Transportation, and if not, if the Uninsured Employers Fund 
is jointly and severally liable along with Mr. Bundy and the 
statutory employer, for the benefits in this case. The defendant, 
Mark Bundy, points to the Lease Agreement as between himself and 
the defendant, B B & B Transportation as support for his position 
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer, in fact, of the 
applicant. As a related issue, Bundy also argues that because of 
Exhibit D-3, which is an Independent Contractor Agreement between 
Bundy and the deceased, Bundy urges that the applicant was also an 
independent contractor. 
That Agreement in its Recital section indicates that the 
contract is being made between the owner, Mark Bundy, and Mr. 
Phillipsen, who is denominated as a contractor. The Recital 
section indicates that the owner owns certain trucks and trucking 
equipment and operates a truck ownership business and that he 
desires Phillipsen as the contractor, to perform the services of 
trucking and truck driving. For these services, the Agreement 
provides that the decedent would receive 2 0% of the revenue 
generated by the load taken, and that he would receive dispatches 
from B B & B Transportation. The Agreement in its "Relationship 
of Parties" section states the following provision: "The parties 
intend this contract to create an employer - independent contractor 
relationship." The Agreement concludes that the decedent would 
hold Bundy harmless from any and all liability for workers 
compensation or any other liability which might be subsequently 
imposed on Bundy. This particular provision of the contract 
appears to be void on its face since it would appear to run 
contrary to the provisions of §35-1-90, Utah Code Annotated. That 
section provides that: "No agreement by an employee to waive his 
rights to compensation under this title shall be valid." The 
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Agreement goes on to provide that Bundy will supply the truck and 
equipment, and will provide for all maintenance for the equipment. 
In reviewing the Agreement and the evidence on the file, it 
would appear that there was no negotiation of the various terms of 
that Agreement. It would further appear that the parties did not 
possess equal bargaining power, in that Bundy owned the truck, 
while the only asset that Phillipsen possessed was his ability to 
drive truck. 
This issue of the effect of an independent contractor 
agreement executed by a driver has been previously addressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the matter of Harry L. Young & Sons v. 
Ashton, P2d 316 (Utah 1975) . In the Ashton case, the Court 
addressed the legal effect of an "Independent Contractor Agreement" 
similar to that executed by Bundy and the decedent in this matter. 
There the Court indicated: 
It should be had in mind that the issue is not 
whether Dennis A. Ashton was an employee of 
Young in the dictionary sense, nor is it to be 
determined solely from the terms used. 
Particularly, its character is not necessarily 
fixed by the fact that the agreement recites 
that it is not an employer - employee 
relationship, but is that of an independent 
contractor. The question of entitlement to 
workman's compensation depends on whether the 
facts and circumstances bring him within the 
requirements of the Workmens Compensation Act. 
The applicable statutory provision which governs this case is 
found in §35-1-42 (5)(a), which provides: 
* * * 
5) (a) If any person who is an employer procures 
any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he 
retains supervision or control, and this 
work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, 
all persons employed by him, all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons 
employed by any of these subcontractors, 
are considered employees of the original 
employer. 
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Section 42, in subsection (2) (b) defines the term independent 
contractor: 
"Independent contractor" means any person 
engaged in the performance of any work for 
another who, while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution 
of the work, is not subject to the rule or control 
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job-or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in effecting a 
result in accordance with the employer's design. 
The Court in Ashton went on to state: 
Speaking in generality: an employee is one who 
is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a 
fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as 
directed by the employer and who is subject to 
a comparatively high degree of control in 
performing those duties. In contrast, an 
independent contractor is one who is engaged 
to do some particular project or piece of 
work, usually for a set total sum, who may do 
the job in his own way, subject to only 
minimal restrictions or controls and is 
responsible only for its satisfactory 
completion. 
To provide guidance in this area, the Court set forth the 
following parameters: 
The main facts to be considered as bearing on 
the relationship here are: (1) Whatever 
covenants or agreements exist concerning the 
right of direction and control over the 
employee, whether express or implied; (2) The 
right to hire and fire; (3) The method of 
payment, i.e., whether in wages or fees, as 
compared to payment for a complete job or 
project; and (4) The furnishing of the 
equipment. (Citation omitted). 
In applying the foregoing legal requirements to the facts of 
this case, I find that as the Court found in Ashton, that although 
the parties recited in their lease that they had an independent 
contractor relationship, the employee, Mr. Phillipsen, had JQO real 
choice. Mr. Phillipsen was paid 20% of the revenue generated for 
the load that he took, and there was no evidence offered to 
indicate that he had any negotiation or bargaining power whatsoever 
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with respect to that term of the agreement. Further, the truck Mr. 
Phillipsen was driving was owned by Mark Bundy. There was no 
provision in the contract whereby Mr. Phillipsen could refuse to 
haul a load or an oversized load for that matter. Further, Mr. 
Bundy had the governor mechanism repaired on the truck that Mr. 
Phillipsen was driving, so that Mr. Phillipsen could not exceed a 
certain speed limit. With respect to the relationship between Mr. 
Bundy and Mr. Phillipsen, Mr. Bundy also retained the power of 
control over the decedent. Although the Independent Contractor 
Agreement did not retain that power, Mr. Bundy retained that power 
in a separate lease agreement he executed in 1990, with B B & B 
Transportation. In that agreement, Mr. Bundy was to furnish a 
driver and was to "have full and exclusive responsibility for. . . 
hiring, setting the wages, hours and working conditions of and 
adjusting the grievances of, supervising, training, disciplining 
and firing of all drivers. . . ", 1990 (Lease at 5 3 (A)). 
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this case 
represents the fact situation anticipated by the Supreme Court when 
it made its observation that: 
The employer wanted the "best of two possible 
worlds." On the one hand to have a person 
rendering a service over whom he can maintain 
a high degree of control, and at the same time 
give the person the status of an independent 
contractor to avoid the responsibilities he 
would have to an employee. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, I find and conclude that 
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy Trucking on May 
10, 1991, when he sustained his fatal compensable industrial 
accident. 
As indicated just previously, there was a separate Lease 
Agreement as between Mark Bundy and B B & B Transportation. That 
Agreement provided that Bundy, as the owner-operator of certain 
trailers and 18 wheel tractors, would furnish that equipment to 
B B & B Transportation. That Agreement provided that B B & B 
Transportation would "Have complete care, custody and control of 
both the leased equipment and the drivers furnished therewith. . ." 
(Lease at 5 3) . That Agreement also provided that B B & B 
Transportation would furnish the general and workers compensation 
coverage (Lease at 5 10,) and would require that all drivers check 
in with B B & B Transportation before making any trip (Lease at 
5 11)• The agreement went on to provide that Bundy would pay all 
equipment expenses including fuel, oil, repairs, taxes and license 
fees (Lease at f 3 (D) ) . And that Bundy shall: "Have full and 
exclusive responsibility for. . . hiring, setting the wages, etc., 
of the drivers." Based on the foregoing provisions of the Lease 
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Agreement between himself and B B & B Transportation, Bundy urges 
that B B & B Transportation was the sole employer of the decedent. 
However, by the very terms of his Lease Agreement with B B & 
B Transportation, Bundy retained the right of control over the 
activities of the decedent, Phillipsen. The surviving spouse of 
the decedent testified that she took approximately ten trips with 
the decedent and on each of those trips, the decedent was required 
to report in to B B & B Transportation on a very regular basis 
concerning his whereabouts at all times. The payment arrangement 
between the parties was such that B B & B Transportation would pay 
Bundy 85% of the revenue generated for the load taken by the 
decedent, and Bundy, in turn, would pay Phillipsen his 20% share of 
the revenue generated. Therefore, under the terms of the 1990 
Lease Agreement, Bundy had the right of control over Phillipsen, 
and he also had the right to hire and fire Phillipsen. In 
addition, Bundy paid Phillipsen7s wages, and he owned and leased 
the tractor and trailer used by Phillipsen in the performance of 
his duties. Based on these factors, and in reliance on the Supreme 
Court decision in the matter of Charles Kinne v. Industrial 
Commission, 609 P2d 926 (Utah 1980) , I find and conclude that Mark 
Bundy is jointly and severally liable with B B & B Transportation 
for the compensation award in this matter. I find, as the Court 
did in Kinne, that: "An employee, for the purpose of workmen's 
compensation may have two employers." 
One final issue involves the relationship of the Uninsured 
Employers Fund and whether or not it has liability for benefits in 
this matter, since the uninsured employer, Mark Bundy, has been 
assessed with joint and several liability. The Uninsured Employers 
Fund relies upon its reading of §35-1-107 (1) , to conclude that 
they have no liability. Section 35-1-107 (1) , states: 
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund. 
The Fund has the purpose of assisting in the 
payment of workers compensation benefits to 
any person entitled to them, if that person's 
employer is individually-jointly, or severally 
liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is 
insolvent, appoints or has appointed a 
receiver, or otherwise does not have 
sufficient funds, insurance, sureties, or 
other security to cover workers compensation 
liabilities. If it becomes necessary to pay 
benefits, the Fund is liable for all 
obligations of the employer as set forth in 
Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, with the 
exceptions of penalties on those obligations. 
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The Uninsured Employers Fund takes the position that it is 
only secondarily liable, and that the statutory employer, B B & B 
Transportation is primarily liable for benefits, and that the 
Uninsured Employers Fund only has liability in the event that the 
statutory employer and the uninsured employer are unable to pay 
benefits. That reading of §35-1-107, seems to give no effect 
whatsoever to the 1988 amendment to §35-1-107. The 1988 amendment 
struck the qualifier every which appeared before employer in §3 5-1-
107. In the pre-1988 version of §107, the Act provided that the 
Uninsured Employers Fund had no liability unless every employer of 
the applicant was insolvent. The Legislature in the 1988 amendment 
specifically removed the word every from that statute. I can only 
conclude that the intent of the Legislature in removing the word 
every was to overcome the effects of the decision in Jacobsen v. 
Industrial Commission, 738 P2d 658, (Utah 1987). 
In that case, the Uninsured Employers Fund and the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah litigated whether or not every employer 
of the applicant had to be insolvent before the Uninsured Employers 
Fund would have liability. In that case, the Court found that the 
term every meant what it said, and, as such, the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah was assessed liability in that case, 
since only the uninsured employer was insolvent. The Administra-
tive Law Judge can only presume that in order to overcome the 
ruling in the Jacobsen case, the Legislature, in its infinite 
wisdom, removed the requirement that every employer be insolvent 
before Uninsured Employer Fund liability would be triggered. To 
adopt the position of the Uninsured Employers Fund which was urged 
at hearing, would mean that the Administrative Law Judge by 
administrative fiat and decision would repeal the 1988 amendment to 
§3 5-1-107. That step this Administrative Law Judge will not take. 
Therefore, I find that based on my reading of §35-1-107, it would 
appear that the Uninsured Employers Fund has joint and several 
liability with the statutory employer upon the uninsured employer 
being unable to pay benefits in a case. 
Applying the foregoing reasoning to this case, I find that the 
death benefits to be awarded to the minor dependents shall be paid 
in the first instance by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, and 
the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall be entitled to 50% 
reimbursement from Mark Bundy. In the event Mark Bundy is without 
sufficient assets or surities to pay his portion of the award, then 
the Uninsured Employers Fund, pursuant to §107 of the Act, shall 
then step in and make the payments in Bundy's stead. 
The applicants herein, have had the benefit of legal counsel 
in these proceedings. As a result, counsel is entitled to_a fee 
for his services. The attorneys fee rule provides that the maximum 
fee payable on a workers compensation case is $7,500.00. Based on 
the amount recovered for the applicants, counsel is entitled to the 
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maximum fee. That fee shall be deducted equally from each of the 
applicant's benefits, which will result in a deduction of $1,875.00 
from each child's accrued award. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Robert T. Phillipsen was an employee of Mark Bundy dba Mark 
Bundy Trucking on May 10, 1991,-when he sustained his fatal 
industrial accident. In addition, Robert T. Phillipsen was a 
statutory employee of B B & B Transportation on May 10, 1991, when 
he sustained his fatal industrial accident. B B & B Transportation 
and Mark Bundy are jointly and severally liable for the death 
benefits due and owing to the applicants as the result of the 
industrial accident sustained by Robert T. Phillipsen on May 10, 
1991, during the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to 
§35-1-107, the Uninsured Employers Fund is jointly and severally 
liable with the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah for death 
benefits in this matter in the event, Mark Bundy is insolvent or 
lacks sufficient assets or sureties to satisfy his portion of the 
award in this matter. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74787-2, which account has as its owner, Joshua J. Newton. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Joshua, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74788-0, which account has as its owner, Shayla M. Phillipsen. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about-May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
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from the accrued award to Shayla, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102,00, for deposit in share account 
#74789-8, which account has as its owner, Stephen B. Phillipsen. 
No disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77,25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Stephen, and shall remit the same to 
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services 
rendered in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mark Bundy and/or B B & B 
Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah pay Mountain 
America Credit Union, $24,102.00, for deposit in share account 
#74790-6, which account has as its owner, Jazmin D. Phillipsen. No 
disbursements shall be made from the account without the written 
authorization of the Commission upon a showing of need. The 
benefits awarded herein shall commence effective May 11, 1991, at 
the rate of $77.25 per week, and shall terminate on or about May 2, 
1997. Accrued amounts shall be paid in a lump sum including 
interest of 8% per annum. The defendants shall deduct $1,875.00 
from the accrued award to Jazmin, and shall remit the same to Kevin 
Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, for services rendered in 
this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mountain America Credit Union mail 
quarterly statements to the children c/o Melanie Phillipsen, 148 
West 100 North, #A-1, Nephi, UT 84648, Mrs. Phillipsen shall 
furnish Mountain America Credit Union with social security numbers 
for the children to facilitate the reporting of interest income, 
and she is responsible for the filing of any required income tax 
returns. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mark Bundy and/or 
B B & B Transportation/Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay 
Kevin Sutterfield, attorney for the applicants, the sum of 
$7,500.00, for services rendered in this matter, the same to be 
deducted from the aforesaid awards to the children as previously 
provided. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on or about March 1, 1997, the 
Workers Compensation Fund shall send Declaration of Dependency 
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forms to Melanie Phillipsen prior to the termination of the 
benefits awarded to the children herein. Thereafter, the children 
will be entitled to continuing death benefits from the defendants 
less an offset for 50% of the Social Security death benefits 
received by them at that time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall 
be paid in full in the first instance by the Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah. The Workers Compensation Fund shall thereafter be 
entitled to reimbursement for 50% of the benefits paid in this 
matter from Mark Bundy on a quarterly basis. In the event Mark 
Bundy is without sufficient assets or sureties or is insolvent and 
is therefore unable to pay his 50% portion of the benefits in this 
matter, then the Uninsured Employers Fund shall make those payments 
for Bundy, and they shall reimburse the Workers Compensation Fund 
of Utah on a quarterly basis. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
/ 
Timothy C/. /Allen 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
Cert; 
May, 
ATIEi 
V, 
if ied 
1993. 
ST: 
this 6 •- . 
' . : • • - / 
day of 
/ / -
Patricia 0. Ashby / / 
Commission Secretary <•" 
/ ""^X 
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Edwards vs. Weather Shield, et al. 
Case No. 92-1252 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
THOMAS M. 
vs. 
EDWARDS, 
Applicant, 
RONALD E. MILLER; WEATHER 
SHIELD TRANSPORTATION, LTD.; 
HOME INSURANCE; and UNINSURED 
EMPLOYERS FUND, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
•k 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 92-1252 
In this matter, the Administrative Law Judge awarded workers' 
compensation benefits to Thomas M. Edwards. The ALJ then 
apportioned liability for those benefits among the various 
defendants: Ronald Miller, Edwards' common law employer, who is 
uninsured; Weather Shield, Edwards' statutory employer, and its 
insurance carrier, Home Insurance, (referred to collectively as 
"Weather Shield11 hereafter) ; and the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
("UEF"). 
The parties agree that Edwards is entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits. However, UEF has filed a timely Motion For 
Review, arguing it should not be held liable for any part of those 
benefits. After UEF filed its Motion For Review, Miller and 
Weather Shield filed their respective Responses. As part of its 
Response, Weather Shield not only replied to UEF's Motion For 
Review, but also argued that it is not Edwards' statutory employer. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ/s Order. The following is a summarization of those facts. 
Miller employed Edwards to drive one of Miller/s trucks. 
Miller then leased the truck and driver to Weather Shield. Under 
the lease agreement, Weather Shield assumed and exercised 
substantial control over Edwards7 work. 
Edwards was .injured while driving the truck and suffered 
medical expenses and disability. At the time of the accident, 
Miller thought he had obtained workers' compensation coverage for 
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Edwards through Thresherman's Insurance. However, Thresherraan's 
subsequently denied responsibility for Edwards' injuries.1 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The issues before the Commission are Weather Shield's status 
as Edward's statutory employer and UEF's liability for a portion of 
Edwards' benefits. 
I. WEATHER SHIELD'S STATUS AS EDWARD'S STATUTORY EMPLOYER. 
The ALJ found that Weather Shield was Edward's statutory 
employer. Weather Shield did not contest the ALJ's finding by 
filing a Motion For Review. Instead, Weather Shield raised the 
issue for the first time in its Response to UEF's Motion For 
Review. 
Section 63-46b-12 of Utah's Administrative Procedures Act 
allows an aggrieved party 30 days in which to seek review of an 
ALJ's decision. Because the 30 day time limit is jurisdictional, 
the Commission has no jurisdiction to consider Issues raised after 
the 30 day period has expired. Maverik v. Industrial Com'n, 860 
P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993) 
In this case, the ALJ issued his decision on May 19, 1993. 
Weather Shield did not raise the issue of its status as a statutory 
employer until July 20, 1993, approximately 60 days later. Because 
Weather Shield did not raise the issue in time, the Commission 
lacks jurisdiction to consider it. The ALJ's conclusion that 
Weather Shield was Edwards' statutory employer therefore remains In 
effect. 
II. UEF'S LIABILITY FOR A PORTION OF EDWARDS' BENEFITS. 
The ALJ concluded that Miller did not have workers' 
compensation coverage at the time of Edwards' accident. Based on 
that fact, the ALJ ruled that UEF may be liable to pay one-half of 
Edwards' benefits, if Miller is insolvent. In reaching that 
conclusion, the ALJ relied upon §3 5-1-107 of Utah's Workers' 
1
 The Commission is concerned that Thresherman's improperly 
denied coverage for Edwards7 injury. However, because that* issue 
is not before the Commission, the Commission must rely upon the 
affected parties to take appropriate action to resolve the issue of 
Thresherman 's liabi1ity. 
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Compensation Act, which provides in material part: 
There is created an Uninsured Employers Fund. The Fund 
has the purpose of assisting in the payment of workers 
compensation benefits to any person entitled to them, if 
that person's employer is individually, jointly, or 
severally liable to pay the benefits, but becomes or is 
insolvent . . . . ~— 
The Commission disagrees with the ALJ's application of the 
foregoing statute. The statute imposes liability on the UEF only 
in those cases where an injured employee's employer is uninsured 
and insolvent. In Utah, an employee may have more than one 
employer, Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 926, 928 (Utah 
1980) . In this case, Edwards had two employers; Miller and Weather 
Shield. The statute must be read in light of that fact. 
While Miller is uninsured and may be insolvent, Edwards has 
another employer—Weather Shield. Weather Shield is neither 
uninsured nor insolvent. Therefore, because Edwards' employer is 
able to pay workers' compensation benefits, the provisions of §35-
1-107(1) are not triggered and the UEF is not obligated to pay any 
portion of Edwards' benefits. 
The Commission notes Weather Shield and Miller's arguments 
regarding the legislative intent behind amendments to §35-1-107, 
but is not persuaded. The Commission believes that the plain 
language of the statute compels the decision reached by the 
Commission. Furthermore, if the Legislature had intended the 
extreme result suggested by Weather Shield and Miller, it could 
have easily said so, in unambiguous terms. 
ORDER 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission modifies the third 
paragraph of the ALJ's Order, found on page twelve of the ALJ's 
decision, to read as follows: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the benefits awarded herein shall 
be paid in full by Home Insurance. 
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The Commission affirms the remainder of the ALJ's decision. 
Dated this day of June, 1994. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Coltcm 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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